People v. Ranger Insurance Co

In People v. Ranger Insurance Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1286, the court reviewed the legislative history which led to the amendment of section 1166, explaining that it would apply standard rules of statutory construction. It set forth these rules as follows: "Our goal is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate its purpose. Our role is limited; we do not question the wisdom, expediency, or policy of legislation. Our task is to examine the statutory language, reading the statute as a whole and giving its words their usual, ordinary and commonsense meaning. 'If the terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. ' We may resort to extrinsic sources only if the words of the statute are ambiguous. " ( People v. Ranger Insurance Co., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 759.) The court then set forth the rules applicable to the construction of bail forfeiture statutes generally: " 'The purpose of bail and forfeiture statutes is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to court orders and judgments. It does not have as a goal revenue for the state or punishment to the surety. ' Because the law disfavors forfeitures and statutes imposing them, we strictly construe section 1166 in favor of the surety to avoid such harsh results. Bond forfeiture statutes are jurisdictional and must be strictly followed. But, ' "the burden is upon the bonding company seeking to set aside the forfeiture to establish by competent evidence that its case falls within the four corners of these statutory requirements. " ' " ( People v. Ranger Insurance Co., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1290.) Independently reviewing the language of section 1166 in accordance with the rules of construction set forth above, the People v. Ranger Insurance Co. court observed that "by its express terms, section 1166 does not apply to convictions entered upon pleas. Section 1166 specifically states that 'if a general verdict is rendered against the defendant, or a special verdict is given, he or she . . . shall be committed . . . to await the judgment. . . .' (see 1151 general verdict is determined upon a plea of not guilty. If a finding of guilt is made by the trier of fact, it imports a conviction; 1152 special verdict defined to be findings of fact by jury.) Section 1166 says nothing about immediate commitment after a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere, even though the effect of a nolo or guilty plea is tantamount to a finding of guilt and conviction. It is not our function to question the language used by the Legislature, nor may we insert language into legislation. If the Legislature had meant for section 1166 to apply in all cases in which a conviction occurs, it would have said so. Apparently, the Legislature meant for section 1166 to apply only if the defendant is convicted after he or she stands trial. Indeed, section 1166 appears in chapter 4 of title 7, which only concerns proceedings on verdicts or findings after trial, rather than in chapter 1 of title 10, which concerns bail. Whatever reasons may have moved the Legislature to limit the application of section 1166 to general or special verdicts, we may not delve beyond the meaning of the plain, unambiguous words it used in the statute. On its face, the statute does not apply to negotiated pleas. Section 1166 refers only to verdicts." ( People v. Ranger Insurance Co., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291, )