In People v. Stickman (1867) 34 Cal. 242, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a chicken house, which was a portion of a barn and not attached to a dwelling house, was a house within the meaning of the burglary statute. The court observed, "The dwelling house, according to Lord Hale, includes the privy, barn, stables, cow houses, dairy houses, if they are parcel of the messuage, though they are not under the same roof or joining contiguous to it. (1 Hale P. C. 558.) And when a burglary is committed in one of these out-buildings the indictment may charge the offense as done in the mansion house." The Supreme Court then noted that the first definition of the offense found in our statute (Stats. 1850, ch. 99, 58, p. 235) abolished all the nice distinctions of the common law by the use of the language, "any dwelling house, or any other house whatever, or tent, or vessel, or other water craft" -- language, the court noted, broad enough to include buildings of any kind and used for any purpose. The court went on to state that when the California statute was amended in 1858 (Stats. 1858, ch. 245, 1, p. 206) substituting the words "any house, room, apartment or tenement," for the words "any dwelling house, or any other house whatever," "the change was not made for the purpose of narrowing the previous definition, but with the intent to leave it as broad as at first and to meet the doctrine advanced by some of the cases, that an entry into an unoccupied room or apartment of a dwelling house was not a burglary." ( People v. Stickman, supra, 34 Cal. 242, 245.)