In People v. Superior Court (Blanquel) (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 768, the defendant's current driving under the influence charges ( 23152, subds. (a) and (b)) were elevated to felonies under section 23550.5, enacted effective July 1, 1999. Because section 23550.5 was new, the defendant's prior conviction had not been punished under sections 23550 or 23550.5, but under former sections 23175 or 23175.5, which had the same substantive content. Although section 23550.5 had been amended effective October 10, 1999, to include references to the former provisions, the trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, reducing his offenses to misdemeanors, on the ground that the statutory version in effect on the day the defendant committed his current offenses did not expressly refer to the former code sections. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its ruling and to enter a new and different order overruling the demurrer and reinstating the special allegation under section 23550.5. We agree with the Blanquel court's reasoning and conclusion. "'"Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which appellate courts review de novo. " Our principal obligation, of course, is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature , a task we usually accomplish by examining the words employed by the drafters, giving them their ordinary meaning. ' Of course, if application of this 'usual' rule of construction would lead to an absurd result or thwart the manifest will of the Legislature, we are required to interpret the law in a manner which avoids the absurdity and is consistent with the legislative design. Such is the case here." ( People v. Superior Court (Blanquel), supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 771.) The court explained that prior to enactment of section 23550.5, section 23175.5 required that offenses committed under section 23152 be treated as felonies if the offender had been convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol within the 10 previous years. "When section 23550.5 was added to the Vehicle Code, that did not change. Only the code section references were modified. The Legislature's failure to include former sections 23175 and 23175.5 in 23550.5 is, therefore, both surprising and ambiguous. Either the Legislature intended to immunize all individuals committing violations of section 23152 between July 1, 1999 and October 10, 1999 from felony treatment under section 23550.5, or it simply overlooked the fact that the former code sections needed to be included in the new provision." ( People v. Superior Court (Blanquel), supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) As the court stated, "It seems to us unlikely that the Legislature intended to turn into lottery winners offenders who happened to commit their offenses during a lucky 100-day window of time. And the legislative history confirms our impression . . . ." ( People v. Superior Court (Blanquel), supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) The court then set out the legislative history of the enactment of section 23550.5, including the Legislative Counsel's Digest comment that "'Existing law makes it a crime to drive a vehicle under the influence of alcohol . . . .This bill, the provisions of which would become operative on July 1, 1999, would reorganize specified provisions relating to the above described driving under the influence offenses without making any substantive changes to those provisions.' " ( Id. at p. 772.) When section 23550.5 was amended to include former sections 23175 and 23175.5, the legislative counsel stated the amendment included "'technical changes' necessary to 'correct cross-references to other provisions of law.' Thus, the legislative purpose is . . . pellucid: reorganization, not change." ( People v. Superior Court (Blanquel), supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.) The court rejected the defendant's claims of violations of constitutional ex post facto proscriptions and due process right to fair notice. In this case, defendant essentially characterizes Blanquel reasoning as permitting the Legislature to create post-enactment ambiguity for the courts to apply, constituting no less a violation of ex post facto prohibitions than a legislative enactment explicitly stating an intent to retroactively change the law. As the Blanquel court observed, "We do not see it that way. Defendant cannot credibly claim he is surprised by our explication of the law. The existence of prior felony convictions has always been considered an aggravating factor when a new offense is committed. And, as we have indicated, there is simply no evidence to suggest a radical departure from that basic principle was intended here." ( People v. Superior Court (Blanquel), supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 772.)