Phillips v. County of Fresno

In Phillips v. County of Fresno (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1240, the Court addressed section 31725. A deputy sheriff shot and killed a man during a shootout. The shooting was found justified and the employee returned to work after a mandatory administrative leave of absence. One year later, the employee injured his neck during a training exercise and was placed on leave of absence with pay for one month. Soon after returning to work, he injured his knee while on duty. He had knee surgery in April 1981, requested and received a medical leave of absence without pay in July 1981, and underwent further surgery in September 1981. Upon advice of his doctors, the employee applied for service-connected disability retirement in December 1981. in December 1983, the retirement board denied his application, finding the employee's physical and emotional problems to be greatly exaggerated. The Fresno County Sheriff told the employee his injuries created too many liabilities to allow him to return to active duty and a doctor's release would be a necessary precondition to reinstatement. ( Id. at pp. 1244-1245.) The employee unsuccessfully petitioned the retirement board for a rehearing and then requested reinstatement to active duty as a deputy sheriff in light of the board's finding that he was capable of performing his usual and customary duties. Neither the employee nor the county sought judicial review of the board's decision and the employee continued on unpaid medical leave until January 1987. At the latter time, the employee returned to active duty pursuant to an order from the new sheriff. From February 1984 until January 1987, the employee received no salary, vacation credits, or annual leave credits, and the county made no retirement contributions on his behalf. The employee petitioned for writ of mandate to compel the county to reinstate him as of the date he was relieved of his duties and status as a paid employee. He also claimed retroactive reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The superior court directed issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate. ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1244-1247.) The County of Fresno filed an appeal, and argued section 31725 only applied when an employee "has been dismissed by an employer, but not when an employee voluntarily remains on medical leave of absence. The County notes in McGriff the employer released the employee without prejudice to reemployment, and in Leili the employer ordered the employee's removal from active duty. Phillips, on the other hand, voluntarily placed himself on temporary medical leave of absence." ( Id. at p. 1254.) In Phillips, the Court rejected the arguments presented by the County of Fresno and held the availability of the remedy provided by section 31725 does not depend upon whether the employer has forced the employee to cease work because of disability or the employee has voluntarily stopped working for that reason. It was undisputed the county never formally terminated the employee, and he was never removed from active duty. His physicians recommended a medical leave of absence and suggested he seek disability retirement. After the denial of his application for retirement disability he sought reinstatement. The county refused to reinstate him and told him he would be returned to active duty upon obtaining a medical release from the county's medical examiner. ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1254-1255.) "Section 31725 attempts to resolve the problem of employees being caught between inconsistent decisions and left without income. Inconsistent decisions left Phillips in the same dilemma. The Retirement Board denied his application for disability retirement, and the sheriff denied his request for reinstatement." ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1255-1256.) Phillips found further support for its conclusion in construing the entirety of the retirement act: "Furthermore, section 31722 authorizes an employee to apply for disability 'while the member is in service, within four months after his discontinuance of service, or while from the date of discontinuance of service to the time of the application he is continuously physically or mentally incapacitated to perform his duties.' 'Discontinuance of service' was construed in Weissman v. Los Angeles County Retirement Assn. (1989) 211 Cal. App. 3d 40, 259 Cal. Rptr. 124 to mean the employee has ceased to work for a salary from which deductions are made. ( Id. at p. 46.) Eligibility for disability retirement benefits does not turn upon whether the employer has dismissed the employee for disability or whether the employee has voluntarily ceased work because of disability. Likewise, availability of the remedy provided by section 31725 does not depend upon whether the employee has been forced by the employer to cease work because of a disability or has voluntarily stopped working for that reason." ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1256.) Phillips also rejected the county's argument that the deputy's situation was distinguishable from Leili and McGriff because he was not ready and willing to return to work: "Logically, a disability which led an employee to apply for disability retirement in the first instance will not instantly disappear upon a retirement board's finding the employee is not incapacitated from performing the duties of the job in question. There is no language in section 31725 which limits its application to those employees who are ready and willing to return to work or which conditions reinstatement upon the employer's finding the employee capable of performing the job." ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1256.) Phillips concluded the clear intent of section 31725 was to release the employee of the financial burden of litigation and place the financial burden on the employer to bring about "serious attempts between the agencies to resolve any disagreement regarding the employee's disability." ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1256.) "The employer cannot deny disability retirement on the basis of there being no disability and then claim disability in order to deny employment income. If the employer and Retirement Board do not agree that the employee is entitled to disability retirement, the employer's recourse is to seek judicial review of the Retirement Board's decision. If review is not pursued, the employee must be reinstated. Section 31725 recognizes no middle ground." ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1258.) While section 31725 does not mandate reinstatement to active duty status, the "language and legislative intent reflect the purpose of the statute is to mandate reinstatement to paid status." ( Phillips, supra, 225 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1257.)