In Rayan v. Dykeman (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d 1629, the parties to a DVA proceeding each personally agreed to a stipulation recited in open court that the complainant would execute a quitclaim deed to certain residential property; the stipulation was later incorporated into an order by the court. ( Id. at p. 1631.) The Court of Appeal rejected the complainant's argument that, because "only certain remedies are specified" in the DVA which do not include an "order transferring title to real estate," the trial court was without authority to make or enforce the order. ( Id. at p. 1633.) The court concluded that, given the complainant's invocation of the jurisdiction of the superior court, her voluntary entry into the stipulation, the connection between the domestic violence in issue and the real estate covered by the stipulation, the purpose of the DVA to prevent the recurrence of domestic violence, and the nonexclusive nature of the remedies provided for by the DVA, the trial court "possessed ample authority to accept the stipulation and enter the order having the effect of a judgment effectuating the stipulation." ( Id. at p. 1634.)