In Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 509, the Supreme Court evaluated a former version of section 11130, subdivision (a), as found in the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act ( 11120 et seq.), which contained the same type of defining language as here, i.e., "any interested person may commence an action . . . for the purpose of stopping or preventing violations or threatened violations of" the act "by members of" a "governmental body," or "to determine" the act's "applicability . . . to actions or threatened future action" by such persons. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the right of action granted by section 11130, subdivision (a) extended only to present and future actions and violations and not to past ones. The court concluded, "the provision's right of action extends only to present and future actions and violations and not past ones." (Regents, supra, 20 Cal. 4th at p. 524.) The facts before the court involved a request by the plaintiff under the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act for relief including a declaration that the defendant governmental body (the Regents of the University of California) violated the act by making a collective commitment or promise to approve certain controversial resolutions, prior to a noticed, open, public meeting, and related relief to invalidate the resolutions as approved. This collective commitment or promise was evidently a one-time event and the plaintiff did not show any such continuing course of conduct. ( Id. at pp. 515-516, 536.) (Later, the legislation thus interpreted was amended by the Legislature to undo this ruling by the Supreme Court; Stats. 1999, ch. 393, 6, amending 11130, subd. (a).) In reaching its conclusions, the Supreme Court examined previous case law arising under the Brown Act, pertaining to section 54960, subdivision (a), the enforcement section. The Supreme Court stated that previous Court of Appeal decisions interpreting this section have assumed or asserted that this provision extends to past actions and violations as well as present and future ones--but, evidently, "only as to past actions and violations that are related to present or future ones. None, however, actually considers whether it does so." ( Regents, supra, 20 Cal. 4th at p. 526, fn. 6.) The Supreme Court then commented, "Be that as it may, there is no indication that any assumption or assertion in these decisions that section 54960(a) possesses a past orientation gave rise to a belief on the part of the Legislature that section 11130(a) possesses one as well." (Ibid.)