In Riley v. Bear Creek Planning Committee (1976) 17 Cal.3d 500, the Supreme Court was concerned with the somewhat esoteric field of subdivision law and whether properties within a subdivision could be burdened by "mutual equitable servitudes" for the benefit of the entire subdivision. Riley held building restrictions for the benefit of an entire subdivision do not spring into existence unless the original grant deed from the subdivider-grantor definitely and clearly expressed an intent to create restrictions common to the conveyed and retained properties. ( Riley, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 505-507, 510.) Only then are subsequent grantees who take from the common grantor-subdivider with actual or constructive notice of the restrictions bound in equity by the restrictions notwithstanding the fact that similar clauses have been omitted from their deeds. ( Id., at p. 507.) Significantly, in Riley the declaration containing the use restrictions was not recorded until nine months after plaintiff-respondent's deed, containing no restrictions, was recorded. The Riley trial court permitted, over objection, evidence of plaintiff's knowledge of these restrictions and their apparent acquiescence therein for a period of time. The pivotal issue, as framed by the court, was whether, in the absence of privity of contract between the parties, the restrictions sought to be enforced by defendants were mutually enforceable equitable servitudes for the benefit of the entire subdivision. The court concluded under the factual situation present that plaintiff's deed was clear and unambiguous, precluding evidence of a contrary intent pursuant to the parole evidence rule and no mutual servitudes were created. The Supreme Court's remarks that equitable servitudes in land may be created only by deed, were germane to a factual situation in which grant deeds were the written instruments used to create the respective rights of the parties.