Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co

In Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 407, the plaintiff (Salas) had worked on a seasonal basis for a number of years for Sierra Chemical Company (Sierra), a business that manufactures, packages and distributes chemicals for treating water, including swimming pool water. (Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 415.) When demand for its products decreased in the fall and winter, Sierra typically laid off many of its production line employees. However, those laid-off workers were generally rehired in the spring when consumer demand increased. (Ibid.) Salas injured his back twice in 2006 and was, at times, only able to perform modified duties. He filed a workers' compensation claim with respect to his workplace injury. Thereafter, Salas was told by Sierra in 2007 that he would not be rehired after the seasonal layoffs unless he obtained a doctor's release indicating that he had been cleared for full duty. (Id. at p. 416.) In response, Salas filed suit against Sierra under the FEHA, claiming that Sierra failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability and that the chemical company's refusal to rehire him was in retaliation for the filing of his workers' compensation claim and for his being disabled. (59 Cal.4th at pp. 416-417.) While preparing for trial, Sierra investigated the authenticity of the documents Salas had provided to the company regarding his immigration status and eligibility to work in the United States. It discovered that Salas had apparently used another person's Social Security number when seeking employment with Sierra. (Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 415, 417.) Thereafter, Sierra filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, under the legal doctrines of after-acquired evidence and unclean hands, based on Salas's fraudulent use of another person's Social Security information to obtain employment. (Ibid.) After the trial court ultimately granted Sierra's summary judgment motion, the appellate court affirmed, concluding that Salas's causes of action were barred under both the after-acquired evidence doctrine and the doctrine of unclean hands. (Id. at p. 418.) The California Supreme Court reversed. With respect to the doctrine of after-acquired evidence, the high court observed that the FEHA "seeks 'to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination or abridgment on account of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military and veteran status.' (Gov. Code, 12920; see id., 12940, subd. (a) unlawful employment practice for employer to refuse to hire or to discharge a person on any of these bases.)" (Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 430.) It also noted that, "in after-acquired evidence cases, the employer's alleged wrongful act in violation of the FEHA's strong public policy precedes the employer's discovery of information that would have justified the employer's decision." (Ibid.) Thereafter, adopting the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. (1995) 513 U.S. 352, the Salas court concluded that "to allow such after-acquired evidence to be a complete defense would eviscerate the public policies embodied in the FEHA by allowing an employer to engage in invidious employment discrimination with total impunity." (Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 430.) Given all of these circumstances, the high court determined that after-acquired evidence cannot be used as an absolute bar to a worker's FEHA claims. (Salas, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 414.)