Sambrano v. City of San Diego

In Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs' opposition included certain evidence to which the defendant objected in its reply. At oral argument, the parties made no further reference to the evidentiary objections, and the trial court explicitly declined to specifically rule on the objections. Instead, it simply stated that it was only relying upon evidence that was competent and admissible ( id. at p. 232), an apparent reference to Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank (1990) 218 Cal. App. 3d 1410, 1419, 267 Cal. Rptr. 819 (superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 72). The Sambrano court noted the problems inherent in Biljac's method of dealing with a trial court's failure to rule on evidentiary objections, even going so far as to disagree with the views expressed Biljac. ( Sambrano, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 235-236.) First, it pointed out that although summary judgments are reviewed de novo, such review presupposes a record on which appropriate legal conclusions can be drawn de novo. Legal issues can be resolved on summary judgment only where there are no material disputed factual issues, and factual issues must be resolved via certain set procedures (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 23), including the resolution of evidentiary objections. (Ibid.) Second, in certain situations the trial court is much better suited to resolving evidentiary issues than is the appellate court. For example, in some cases, the trial court must exercise its discretion as to whether certain evidence is admissible or not. ( Id. at p. 236.) Third, Biljac's conclusion that the parties remain free to press their evidentiary objections on appeal failed to take into account the longstanding waiver rule, the same rule relied upon by the court in Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 670, fn. 1 (ibid.), or the exception to the waiver rule, the "fruitless or idle act" exception relied upon by the court in City of Long Beach, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 784. (Ibid.)