In Scarzella v. DeMers (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1762, a unanimous panel of the Third District, in an opinion authored by Justice Blease, affirmed a judgment of the Sacramento Superior Court entered after that court had granted a motion to dismiss under sections 583.410 and 583.420(a)(1) where the plaintiff, as here a former client and initially in pro per, was suing his former attorneys for legal malpractice, but did not serve them with the summons and complaint until 28 months after the complaint was filed. Our colleagues in the Third District found no abuse of discretion. In so holding, and after quoting those two key statutes, they wrote: "The statutory scheme is derived from the preexisting law. The California Law Revision Commission comment to section 583.420 provides in pertinent part: 'Subdivision (a)(1) of Section 583.420 continues the substance of former Section 583(a) as it related to the authority of the court to dismiss for delay in making service. . . . We deem the comment entitled to substantial weight. . . . The question is one of trial court discretion. The unexcused failure to serve a summons within the two-year period prima facie constitutes a sufficient ground for dismissal. In such a case there is no requirement for an affirmative showing of prejudice. Notice of the plaintiff's potential claim was unavailing; the defendant has no duty to act affirmatively but need only respond, beginning with the service of summons. The pendency of the related worker's compensation proceedings was no excuse; 'The proper procedure is to serve the summons within a reasonable time after the complaint is filed, and, if necessary, apply for a continuance in bringing the case to trial.' An unsupported claim that time was needed to develop the facts and law to permit service on the defendant was 'meretricious.' . . . Dismissal for failure to serve summons within two years under section 583.420, subdivision (a)(1), and dismissal for failure to bring the action to trial within the prescribed time under section 583.420, subdivision (a)(2), after the action is commenced, are both matters within the discretion of the trial court. Although both are addressed in the same statute, the scope of discretion is not the same. 'The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the "legal principles governing the subject of the action . . . ."' . . . The legal principles governing the failure to timely bring a matter to trial do not control the failure to timely serve summons. The standard of excuse for delay in service of summons is more stringent than that applicable to a delay in bringing a matter to trial. This is shown, albeit somewhat obscurely, in the text of section 583.420, subdivision (b). It provides that the times prescribed in subdivision (a), after which dismissal may be granted, are to be computed in the manner provided under the statutes governing the time for mandatory dismissal. The contrast between the statutes to which section 583.420, subdivision (b) refers indicates that delay in service and delay in bringing the matter to trial after service are measured by different standards for excuse." (Scarzella, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1768-1770.)