Sexton v. Atchison etc. Ry

In Sexton v. Atchison etc. Ry. (1916) 173 Cal. 760, the plaintiff, a railroad shareholder, sought to challenge section 11 of the Public Utilities Act, which allowed commission members and employees to ride any railroad for free when in the performance of their duties. (Sexton, supra, 173 Cal. at pp. 760-762.) The plaintiff contended that the section deprived the railroad of property without due process in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. (Id. at p. 762.) The superior court sustained demurrers to the complaint for lack of jurisdiction under former section 67 (predecessor to 1759), and the California Supreme Court affirmed. (173 Cal. at p. 765.) The plaintiff in Sexton made the same arguments PegaStaff asserts here--"that there can be no official duty, within the meaning of that term as used in the section, to enforce a provision of the act that is in violation of a constitutional provision, ... and that it was not the design of the section to interfere, in any way, with the jurisdiction of the superior court to inquire as to the validity of any provision of the act, and to prevent by injunction the attempted enforcement by the commission of the provision if it found it to be invalid." (Id. at p. 763.) The court gave short shrift to these arguments: "The first of these arguments is not very earnestly pressed, and of course could not be in view of the language of the section. The matter of orders and decisions of the commission is dealt with in the first portion of the provision, while the latter portion, in language that cannot be read otherwise, prevents any such interference as is therein declared with any official duty of the commission. We are satisfied that the second claim is equally untenable. The plain design of the provision was to prevent any interference with the commission by the courts, except as prescribed in the act itself, in the performance of any duty defined by the act. The term 'official duties' as used therein cannot reasonably be given any other meaning, especially when considered in connection with the first portion of the provision, as it must be." (Id. at pp. 763-764.)