In Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, Shirk, a 41-year-old plaintiff in 2003, claimed she was the victim of sexual misconduct by her male teacher during the 1978-1979 school year. She sued the school district that employed him on the basis that it knew or should have known that he was a sexual predator. Shirk filed a government tort claim in September 2003, the date on which she allegedly "discovered" the connection between her psychological problems and the sexual abuse. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that Shirk failed to timely file a government tort claim in 1980. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 205-206.) Although the suit was brought under the 2003 "revival" window set forth in section 340.1, Shirk still faced the problem of having failed to file a government claim within the statutory period. She attempted to steer around this obstacle by relying on the delayed discovery rule in section 340.1, subdivision (a), contending that her claim did not "accrue" until she discovered that the sexual abuse was the cause of her psychological injuries. (Shirk, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 206.) After reviewing the history of the statute, the Shirk court reaffirmed the long-settled rule that a cause of action for sexual abuse accrues at the time of the molestation. (Id. at p. 210.) Finding no indication in either the language or history of the statute that the Legislature's magnanimity in liberalizing the limitations period for civil actions for childhood sexual abuse also included an intent to excuse or delay the time for filing tort claims against governmental entities, the state's high court held Shirk's action was properly dismissed. (Id. at pp. 211-213.)