In Simpson v. Municipal Court (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 591, the court examined the constitutional validity of a statute that prohibited picketing inside the state capitol building. Although Simpson recognized picketing was a classic form of petition activity, it also recognized the ban was designed to promote two interests: to avoid disruptions that would "debase the quality of the Legislature's deliberative processes"; and to prevent patrols of picketers from creating an oppressive atmosphere that might discourage or repel others from visiting and speaking. ( Id. at p. 597.) Simpson, reasoning that this restriction on petition rights promoted the First Amendment rights of others, explained at page 598 that: "Many constituents would find these patrols discomfiting, repugnant, even threatening. They would prefer to stay away, to address legislators by other means or not at all. While expressing the pickets' own views, the patrols would tend to chill and repress the views of others. 'To enforce freedom of speech in disregard of the rights of others would be harsh and arbitrary in itself.' ( Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77, 88; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal. 3d 930, 941.) The very presence of the patrols tends to block the vital lines of communication between legislators and their constituents." Simpson upheld the law because it banned all picketers equally and without regard to the content of their message, was narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate and substantial governmental interests, and banned only a narrow type of picketing while omitting other forms of picketing from its ambit. ( Simpson v. Municipal Court, supra, 14 Cal. App. 3d at p. 599.)