In Singleton v. United States Gypsum Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1547the Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on the plaintiff employee's complaint alleging sex discrimination and harassment. The heterosexual male plaintiff claimed he was sexually harassed by two male coworkers who repeatedly called him "Sing-a-ling," a reference to a homosexual character in a movie. (Singleton, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1551-1552.) Plaintiff claimed that one of the coworkers made statements that "challenged him as a man," such as suggesting that he was wearing a G-string and making comments about his performing oral sex on his supervisor and engaging in anal sex. (Id. at p. 1553.) The other coworker also allegedly described to plaintiff how he would engage in anal and oral sex with plaintiff, and he told plaintiff that the reason plaintiff was still employed was that he (plaintiff) was performing oral sex on his supervisor. (Ibid.) Plaintiff "testified that, as a result of the coworkers' comments and taunting, work became a 'living hell,' and that his performance was adversely affected." (Id. at p. 1554.) The plaintiff thought that the coworkers were harassing him because, among other reasons, he had complained to management about one of them having sabotaged equipment. (Id. at p. 1555.) The Singleton court found there were triable issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff was subject to sexual harassment in violation of the FEHA. (Singleton, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1551, 1564.) The court concluded there was evidence that the plaintiff was disparately treated because of his sex, as shown by plaintiff's own deposition testimony that the harassing comments his coworkers directed at him challenged him as a man. (Id. at pp. 1561-1562.) The court reasoned that "plaintiff recognized, as would any reasonable heterosexual male, that his coworkers targeted his heterosexual identity, and attacked it by and through their comments. . . . Given that the coworkers had targeted plaintiff's identity as a heterosexual male, it is axiomatic that they would treat women 'differently,' i.e., not attack them for the same reason. It follows that the harassment was 'because of sex,' i.e., it employed attacks on plaintiff's identity as a heterosexual male as a tool of harassment." (Id. at p. 1562.) The Singleton court further concluded that "the social context within which the coworkers acted also made clear that what these two men intended to do was to harass plaintiff." (Singleton, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564.) Noting that the coworkers were "'acting out . . . their anger and rage at plaintiff,'" the Singleton court concluded "there is no requirement that the motive behind the sexual harassment must be sexual in nature. 'Harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.' Sexual harassment occurs when, as is alleged in this case, sex is used as a weapon to create a hostile work environment." (Singleton, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1564.)