In Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Sandyland Protective Assn. (1990) 224 Cal. App. 3d 1494, Sandyland, a homeowners association, entered into an agreement with Southern Pacific, a railroad company, under which Sandyland agreed to construct and to maintain a road across Southern Pacific's railroad tracks. The agreement included a clause in which Sandyland agreed to indemnify Southern Pacific and to hold it harmless against all claims arising out of the use of the road, "regardless of any negligence or alleged negligence on the part of Railroad." Subsequently, two persons filed suit against Southern Pacific alleging they were injured when their car was struck while crossing Southern Pacific's tracks on Sandyland's road. Southern Pacific cross-complained against Sandyland for indemnity. Sandyland moved for summary judgment arguing the indemnity clause was unenforceable under Civil Code section 2782, subdivision (a), which states in part, "provisions, clauses . . . or agreements contained in, collateral to, or affecting any construction contract and which purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages . . . arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee . . . are against public policy and are void and unenforceable. . . ." The trial court granted Sandyland summary judgment based on that statute and Southern Pacific appealed. Among other things, Southern Pacific argued that that limitation set forth in Civil Code section 2782 subdivision (a) was not applicable because the injured plaintiffs had been concurrently negligent and therefore the damages were not caused by the "sole negligence . . . of the promisee." The Sandyland court rejected that argument as follows: "The manifest purpose of the Legislature in enacting section 2782 was to prevent one party to a construction contract from shifting the ultimate responsibility for its negligence to a nonnegligent party. That purpose would not be advanced by a construction of the statute that would allow a shifting of responsibility to a nonnegligent party upon a showing that the tort claimant and the promisee were comparatively negligent. Accordingly, we construe the phrase 'sole negligence . . . of the promisee' to mean that as between the promisee and the promisor, the promisee was solely negligent. Therefore, absent negligence on the part of the association, a party to the agreement, the negligence, if any, of the plaintiffs, who are third parties, is immaterial." (Sandyland at pp. 1498-1499.)