In Souza v. Lauppe (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 865, the trial court treated a complaint alleging causes of action for negligence and unlawful business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. as in fact based on a theory of nuisance because they alleged the violation of a single primary right, "i.e., plaintiffs' right to the unimpaired ownership and undisturbed enjoyment of their premises." ( Souza, 59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 870.) Souza involved irrigation, the very agricultural activity involved here, except as to rice crops. For approximately five years, the parties, commercial farmers with bordering farm lands, farmed rice on their land. ( Id. at p. 869.) After the plaintiffs shifted to planting row crops, they noticed when defendants' rice fields were flooded, the portion of their land closest to the defendants' became so wet that it could not be farmed. (Ibid.) The plaintiffs sued defendants, seeking an injunction and damages for negligence and unfair business practices, and the defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on the ground plaintiffs' lawsuit was barred by section 3482.5. ( Souza, 59 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 870-871.) The issue before the appellate court in Souza was whether the statute applied to an action against a commercial entity by another commercial entity as opposed to a non-agricultural plaintiff; the court concluded the statute's language was unambiguous and broadly applied to such circumstances. ( Souza, 59 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 873-874.) In Souza, the Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's claim that the words "any changed condition" were uncertain and needed interpretation by resort to legislative history. Instead, it found the use of "the word 'any' expresses an unambiguous legislative intent to broadly apply the statute." (Souza, supra, 59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 873.) Thus, the court upheld application of section 3482.5 in instances where a commercial agricultural entity sues another commercial agricultural entity, holding the statutory language did not limit the statute's preclusive effect to actions commenced by nonagricultural plaintiffs. ( Souza, 59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 874.) The Souza court stated, "even if, as plaintiffs suggest, the Legislature did not have such an application in mind when it enacted section 3482.5, a different construction is not required because our interpretation of the statute is compelled by the plain meaning of its words, does not frustrate its apparent purpose, and does not result in absurd consequences." (Souza, at. p. 874.)