In Sternberg v. Superior Court (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 281, the magistrate inadvertently failed to sign a search warrant delivered to levying officers, although he did sign and approve the supporting affidavit. The executing police officers, in good faith and without actual knowledge of the defect, seized certain articles pursuant to the warrant. After discovering this absence on the warrant, one of the officers obtained the magistrate's signature later on the same day. ( Sternberg v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at pp. 284-285.) Upon appeal, the court sustained the lower court's denial of the suppression motion. After reiterating the two reasons behind Penal Code section 1533, the court found (1) that the magistrate had clearly exercised his discretion in granting the unsigned warrant, and (2) that the householder knew that the search had been authorized. ( Id., at pp. 289-290.) In determining that the second consideration of Penal Code section 1533 had been satisfied, the court said: "Here where the warrant was unsigned by the judge, as in the case of a nighttime search, the second purpose of the warrant is to let the householder know that the intrusion has been authorized by a magistrate. The lack of the signature of the magistrate whether made by him , or by someone else under his authority , would appear to be fatal to the accomplishment of that purpose. If petitioner, or the occupant of the premises where he allegedly had stored stolen goods, had challenged the warrant, any further attempt to conduct a legal search and seizure under its authority would have been forestalled . . . . Here there was no such challenge . . . . ". . . . "It is, therefore, concluded that under the peculiar circumstances of this case any insufficiency on the face of the warrant, because the magistrate inadvertently failed to sign it, was cured by his affixing his signature at the earliest opportunity after such omission was discovered and prior to any challenge to the warrant." ( Sternberg v. Superior Court, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at pp. 290-291, italics added.) In addition, the court also indicated that even if the warrant was insufficient on its face, there was no reason to suppress the evidence seized because the officers acted in good faith and without actual knowledge of the defect. ( Sternberg, supra, at p. 292.)