In Stinnett v. Tam (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1412, the plaintiff argued that section 3333.2 was no longer rational because medical malpractice insurance rates were no longer "skyrocketing" or threatening the availability of health care, and because Proposition 103 empowered the Insurance Commissioner to regulate and prescribe malpractice insurance rates. The court of appeal acknowledged that "'"the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist."' " (Id. at p. 1428.) It concluded that the principle of changed circumstances was not applicable, however, because the Supreme Court in Fein "did not find section 3333.2 constitutional based on a particular set of facts, i.e., whether a medical malpractice insurance crisis actually existed, but instead did so based on the Legislature's power to determine whether such a crisis existed and to craft remedies to solve the crisis the Legislature found." (Id. at p. 1430.) The Stinnett court also substantively rejected the plaintiff's implicit contentions that section 3333.2 was obsolete or no longer necessary to reduce medical malpractice costs. Relying on American Bank, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 374, the court explained that "'the constitutionality of a measure under the equal protection clause does not depend on a court's assessment of the empirical success or failure of the measure's provisions,' and the equal protection clause is satisfied by the court's conclusion that, from the information before it, 'the Legislature could rationally have decided that the enactment might serve its insurance cost reduction objective.'" (Stinnett, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430.) The court further explained that the circumstances in which a court may deem a law unconstitutional in light of changed conditions are "'quite narrow' (Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 952, 973 )" (Stinnett, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430), and suggested that the plaintiff would be better served by addressing her concerns to the Legislature, as "it is not the judiciary's function to determine when constitutionally valid legislation has served its purpose." (Id. at pp. 1430-1431.)