In Stuart v. Lilves (1989) 210 Cal. App. 3d 1215, a California resident purchased a home in Colorado and included as consideration a note secured by a second deed of trust. Later, the holder of the first deed of trust foreclosed and the property was sold. The home seller initiated an action in California to collect on the note, and the buyer successfully defended on the basis of the antideficiency statute. ( Stuart, supra, 210 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 1217-1218.) The seller then brought an action in Colorado, which did not have an antideficiency statute, and prevailed. The Colorado court concluded the prior California judgment had not been on the merits but rather was based on a statutory bar rendering the claim unenforceable. The seller filed a second action in California to enforce the Colorado judgment, and the trial court denied the buyer's motion to vacate the Colorado judgment. ( Id. at pp. 1218-1219.) The Court of Appeal reversed. ( Stuart, supra, 210 Cal. App. 3d at p. 1222.) After explaining the first California judgment had been on the merits and was res judicata as to the seller's claim, notwithstanding the contrary conclusion of the Colorado court, the Court of Appeal discussed the effect of the full faith and credit clause: "'The general rule is that when courts of different jurisdictions have reached different results on the same issue, the later judgment controls. However, it is also the rule that when one of the conflicting decisions was entered by a court of the state in which the current action is pending, that decision takes precedence over the court of a sister state.'" ( Id. at p. 1220.) The court reiterated the sentiment of Hammell: "'If full faith and credit is to be given, it should have been given to the California judgment by the Colorado court when entertaining the plaintiff's action . . . .'" ( Id. at p. 1221.)