In Sumpter v. Matteson (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 928, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered personal injuries when she was struck by a car driven by the defendant, who was intoxicated. (Id. at pp. 931-932.) The plaintiff sought an award of punitive damages against the defendant on the theory that he had "engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard to the rights or safety of others, in that he knew he was under the influence while driving the vehicle." (Ibid.) At trial, the defendant admitted that he had used methamphetamines before the incident, that he had ingested drugs just before driving the vehicle, and that he knew he was under the influence when he got into his car. (Id. at p. 930.) The jury nonetheless returned a special verdict that the defendant had not engaged in malice or oppression for purposes of a punitive damage award, and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages but no punitive damages. (Id. at p. 932.) The plaintiff unsuccessfully sought a new trial on the grounds that the evidence did not support the verdict, the verdict was contrary to law, and the damages were inadequate. (Id. at p. 933.) On appeal, the plaintiff contended that she was entitled to a new trial on the amount of punitive damage, as the evidence at trial established as a matter of law that she had satisfied the factual predicates for such an award. (Sumpter v. Matteson, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 935-936.) The appellate court rejected this contention, notwithstanding the undisputed evidence the defendant had acted with malice, reasoning that the decision to award punitive damages was the "exclusive prerogative" of the jury. (Ibid.)