In Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3d 465, the Court held that when a mental examination of an accused is ordered under section 1026 to determine the issue raised by a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, "the presence of counsel at the psychiatric examination is not constitutionally required as long as three conditions are met: (1) counsel is informed of the appointment of psychiatrists; (2) the court-appointed psychiatrists are not 'permitted to testify at the guilt trial' unless the defendant places 'his mental condition into issue at the guilt trial'; and (3) 'if defendant does specifically place his mental condition into issue at the guilt trial,' and the psychiatrist testifies, the court must instruct the jury that his 'testimony as to defendant's incriminating statements should not be regarded as proof of the truth of the facts disclosed by such statements,' but 'may be considered only for the limited purpose of showing the information upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion.' " ( Id. at p. 469, quoting In re Spencer, supra, 63 Cal. 2d at p. 412.) Concluding that a defendant afforded these protections is not entitled to counsel at a court ordered psychiatric examination, the Tarantino court went on to state that, "nonetheless, the trial court, 'in its discretion' may permit counsel to be present as an observer, that determination to turn in substantial part upon the attitude of the psychiatrist." ( Id. 48 Cal. App. 3d at p. 469.) 7 In Tarantino . . ., the Court of Appeal concluded a psychiatrist appointed to examine a defendant for competency could not testify later on the question of the defendant's sanity. The court reasoned that because a defendant may not invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination in an examination for competency, 'neither the statements of the defendant to the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of such statements may be used in trial of the issue of the defendant's guilt, under either the plea of not guilty or that of not guilty by reason of insanity.' ( Id. at p. 470.) Such judicially declared immunity was 'reasonably to be implied from the code provisions. The purpose of an inquiry into competency is not to determine guilt or innocence. It has no relation to the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Rather, the sole purpose . . . is the humanitarian desire to assure that one who is mentally unable to defend himself not be tried upon a criminal charge. This purpose is entirely unrelated to any element of guilt, and there is no indication of any legislative intent that any result of this inquiry into a wholly collateral matter be used in determining the issue of guilt. . . . Both humanitarian and practical considerations call for a judicially declared immunity.' ( Id. at p. 469.)