In Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, the information was filed August 16, 1974, and the public defender was appointed to represent the defendant. At a hearing held August 29, the court set a trial date of October 25. Counsel consented to that trial date (beyond the 60-day limit). On the date set for trial counsel requested a continuance until October 28 because his heavy caseload had prevented him from adequately preparing for trial. On October 28, the same counsel moved for another continuance on the same grounds and trial was reset for November 7. On that date counsel was in another trial and a colleague appeared on the petitioner's behalf. The court and counsel agreed that the matter could be trailed until counsel became available. Trailing continued until November 12, when counsel appeared and announced that he was ready for trial but explained that he was trailing in another case deemed by counsel to be more pressing. Counsel requested the matter be trailed until the other trial was completed. Out of concern that the 10-day grace period found in the last sentence of section 1382, subdivision 2, would expire, the matter was eventually scheduled for November 18, the last day of the 10 days. On November 18, the parties appeared, ready to proceed, but the court, over defense counsel's objection, continued the matter until November 25 because of a calendar conflict. The court calculated the 10-day grace period from November 18, whereas the defendant calculated it from November 12, the date when counsel stated he was ready. A defense motion to dismiss for violation of section 1382 was denied, and review of that denial was obtained by writ. Before addressing the question of when the grace period began, the Townsend court considered the question of whether counsel could properly consent to trial beyond the 60-day limit. The court noted that the defendant at no time personally agreed to a continuance beyond 60 days, and at every stage of the proceedings refused to "waive time" and pointed out to the court that he had been in custody beyond 60 days and should be tried or released. The court resolved the issue as follows: "We have concluded, subject to certain limitations, that consent of counsel alone without that of the client, satisfies section 1382, subdivision 2. While no previous California cases have considered the precise issue, the general import of other cases dealing with similar issues arising from related and parallel circumstances supports such a conclusion. In People v. Kirkpatrick (1972) 7 Cal.3d 480, 485-486 . . . for instance, we rejected a speedy trial claim despite the fact that the defendant had personally refused to waive time. Citing People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 554 . . . , we held that counsel's consent to delays beyond 60 days is sufficient, at least where the continuances are reasonable. In People v. Wilson (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 913 at page 915 . . . , the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's grant of continuances at counsel's request where no affirmative consent was obtained from the defendant, the court stating in dictum that 'even if appellant had voiced an objection, his attorney would have had authority to seek continuance over the client's protest. ' "In general, it is well established that the power to control judicial proceedings is vested exclusively in counsel. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.3d 480, 486; People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 704 . . . People v. Merkouris, supra, 46 Cal.2d 540, 554 297 P.2d 999.) It follows that ' except where representation by counsel is so ineffective that it can be described as a "farce and a sham" , an attorney may ordinarily waive his client's rights . . . .' ( People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 114 . . . .) Where counsel has been appointed and is present in court 'neither the party himself nor another attorney , can be recognized.' ( People v. Merkouris, supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 554-555.) While the United States Supreme Court has recently held that a criminal defendant cannot be denied the right to represent himself if he knowingly and intelligently chooses to forego the assistance of counsel ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . . .), Faretta has no effect on cases such as that before us where counsel has in fact been appointed. In such instances, Faretta, in discussing California criminal procedure, notes: 'The appointed counsel manages the lawsuit and has the final say in all but a few matters of trial strategy. ' ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 812, fn. 8 . . . .) "Counsel's control, of course, is not unlimited, and there are certain fundamental protections guaranteed an accused which counsel may not waive without his client's concurrence. ( Brookhart v. Janis (1966) 384 U.S. 1, 7 . . . jury trial and confrontation; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905 . . . same; People v. Robles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 205, 215 . . . right to testify in own defense.) The right to a speedy trial is undeniably 'as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment' ( Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra, 386 U.S. 213, 223 . . .), and we have previously stated in dictum that counsel may not waive this constitutional right over his client's objections. ( People v. Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d 694, 706-707.) In contrast, however, the statutory right to be tried within 60 days ( 1382, subd. 2) cannot properly be termed 'fundamental' in the foregoing sense and therefore beyond counsel's primary control. Being of statutory origin, a defendant's rights under section 1382 are 'merely supplementary to and a construction of the Constitution. ' ( Sykes v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 83, 89 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 507 P.2d 90.) They do not carry the force or weight of constitutionally mandated imperatives. In this connection we think it significant that the United States Supreme Court has clearly rejected the proposition that the constitutional right to a speedy trial '. . . can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.' ( Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 523 . . . .) "The case before us presents a confrontation between two of the defendant's rights, the right to a speedy trial constitutionally guaranteed and statutorily implemented and amplified within the time framework of Penal Code section 1382 on the one hand, and his Sixth Amendment right to competent and adequately prepared counsel on the other. In such a situation, in the words of the appellate court in People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 148 . . . , the trial court must carefully navigate procedurally between 'the Scylla of delay and the Charybdis of ineffective and inadequate representation.'" (15 Cal.3d at pp. 780-782.) The Townsend court ultimately concluded that the 10-day grace period began on November 18, when counsel first objected to any further delay, and that under the circumstances all the continuances were justified. It reasoned as follows: "Accordingly, three reasons appear for the delay in petitioner's trial: (1) Inability of defense counsel adequately to prepare for trial announced by him on October 25th and 28th, (2) conflict in trial dates involving defense counsel resulting in a 'trailing' which occurred on November 7th, 12th, 13th and 15th, and (3) a court calendar conflict on November 18th. Inadequacy of time for defense counsel to prepare for trial, and calendar conflicts of court and defense counsel account for the delay involved. In Townsend, when trial was originally set for October 25, it was set beyond the statutory limit in spite of the fact that the defendant objected "at every stage of the proceedings" to any waiver of time. Though the opinion does not explain why the original trial date was set beyond the 60-day limit, the continuances to October 28 and to November 7 were "because counsel's heavy caseload had prevented him from adequately preparing for petitioner's trial." (15 Cal.3d at p. 778.)