In Turner v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1046, the defendant was committed as an SVP in 1999. Before his term expired, recommitment proceedings were commenced. In 2001, after a trial, the jury found that the defendant was not an SVP, and he was released on parole. In 2002, while on parole, he was arrested for violating a curfew. A new commitment proceeding was commenced, and at the probable cause hearing, two psychologists opined that the defendant qualified as an SVP. These were the same two psychologists who had testified in support of his commitment in 1999. They did not base their opinions and conclusions on events and evidence that occurred after the prior trial--i.e., the curfew violation--but rather on the same evidence presented at the prior trial, where the jury found that the defendant was not an SVP. Moreover, neither psychologist accepted the jury's previous and contrary finding or explained why, despite that determination, the facts were sufficiently different to support their conclusions that the defendant was likely to reoffend. (Id. at pp. 1050-1054, 1062-1063.) The defendant claimed the expert testimony was not enough to show probable cause and argued that the district attorney was trying to relitigate the previous SVP petition. The court rejected this claim, and the defendant sought writ relief. The reviewing court held that the district attorney was barred from relitigating the issue of whether the defendant was likely to reoffend in 2001. That issue had been determined by the jury. Rather, the issue was whether defendant was likely to reoffend in 2002. (Turner, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1059-1060) Thus, "to establish probable cause in the subsequent proceeding, the district attorney must present evidence of a change of circumstances, i.e., that despite the fact the individual did not possess the requisite dangerousness in the earlier proceeding, the circumstances have materially changed so that he now possesses that characteristic. In requiring the district attorney to present evidence of changed circumstances, we are not suggesting that historical information is no longer relevant. It clearly is. A mental health professional cannot be expected to render opinions as to current status without fully evaluating background information. However, where an individual has been found not to be an SVP and a petition is properly filed after that finding, the professional cannot rely solely on historical information. The professional must explain what has occurred in the interim to justify the conclusion the individual currently qualifies as an SVP." (Id. at p. 1060.) The court concluded that the expert opinion testimony, which was not based on new facts or changed circumstances, failed to support a finding of probable cause. (Id. at pp. 1061-1063.)