In Vann v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal. App. 3d 192, the defendant informed his counsel on the Thursday night preceding a trial set for the following Monday that he did not agree to a proposed settlement. Defense counsel told the defendant that he was going to ask to be relieved, later asserting to the trial court that defendant had been "dilatory in 'withdrawing from the agreement' that both counsel had worked out to settle the case." ( Id. at p. 195.) A substitution of attorney form, substituting the defendant in propria persona, was filed on Friday. On Monday, defense counsel who had substituted out appeared and requested a continuance of trial so that the defendant could get a new attorney. Counsel for the plaintiff also requested a continuance, stating that he had assumed the case was settled and had therefore not prepared for trial. The requests were denied, and the case was sent out for trial. Once in the trial department, the defendant's propria persona request for a continuance was denied, trial was conducted, and a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. ( Id. at pp. 194-196.) The Vann court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the continuance. The court found that defense counsel had withdrawn from the case and had done so for the "personal reason" that he "may well have been irked to see a settlement that he had negotiated fail of consummation." ( Id. at p. 197.) The withdrawal was "not ethical" under the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. (Ibid.) The court further held that "where an attorney withdraws from a case the Friday before the Monday morning of a trial, the party ordinarily does not have sufficient time to procure counsel . . . ." (Ibid.) Moreover, "the presiding judge made no effort to analyze the situation in which the defendant found himself. The denial by the trial court judge was peremptory and based solely on a policy against continuances, without considering whether the case before it justified a departure from that salutary policy. Defendant was entitled to the exercise of an informed discretion; the record does not evidence any attempt to exercise any discretion." ( Id. at pp. 198-199.) In short, the trial court denied a motion to continue trial even though the appellant's attorney had withdrawn on the eve of trial. Concluding the court had abused its discretion, the appellate court stated: "Where an attorney withdraws from a case the Friday before the Monday morning of a trial, the party ordinarily does not have sufficient time to procure counsel, and unless the party actually had sufficient advance warning that his attorney intended to withdraw, the circumstances justified granting a continuance. It has been held that where a party has stated his case to his attorney and the attorney doesn't show up because of an illness in the family, and the party first ascertains this fact on the morning of the day of trial, and the cannot procure other counsel, a continuance should be granted." ( Id. at pp. 197-198.)