In Varwig v. Anderson-Behel Porsche/Audi, Inc. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 578, the defendant car seller argued it made its alleged fraudulent representation not to the ultimate buyer (Varwig), but to the intermediary auto seller, and that as a result its representation as to title was not actionable by the plaintiff. (Varwig, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 581.) The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, noting the contract for the sale of the car between defendant and the auto seller contained a certification that the car would be resold or "wholesaled," putting the defendant on notice of a subsequent purchaser. (Ibid.) The court held that under these facts and section 533 of the Restatement Second of Torts, the defendant's representation to the auto seller was in law an indirect misrepresentation to the plaintiff, who purchased the car in reliance upon the auto seller's repetition of the representation. (Ibid. Varwig explained further, relying on comment g to the Restatement, "It is not necessary that the maker of the representation 'have any particular person in mind. It is enough that he intends or has reason to expect to have it repeated to a particular class of persons and that the person relying upon it is one of that class.'" (Varwig, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 581, quoting Rest.2d Torts, 533, com. g.)