In Venoco, Inc. v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 750, an oil company, Venoco, was covered under a liability policy with a pollution exclusion clause. The policy included a pollution buy-back provision that created an exception to the pollution exclusion, provided that certain conditions were met. The conditions included a reporting requirement: the pollution occurrence "'became known to the Insured within 7 days after its commencement and was reported to Insurers within 60 days thereafter.'" (Id., at pp. 758.) The pollution occurrence was not required to be reported during the policy period. Years after the expiration of the policy, pollution lawsuits were filed against Venoco. It requested that the insurer, Gulf, provide a defense. Venoco asserted that "at least five of the actions . . . contained injury claims alleged to have occurred 'during the term of Gulf's insurance coverage.'" (Id., at p. 756.) Gulf refused to defend Venoco. It contended that, because "'Venoco never gave any notice of any occurrence to Gulf during the effective period of the Gulf Policy or sixty days thereafter, Venoco has not satisfied the conditions of the Buy-Back Clause.'" (Venoco, Inc. v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 756.) Venoco claimed that "the 60-day reporting requirement is unenforceable because Gulf did not prove it would suffer substantial prejudice if notice were given later than 60 days." (Id., at p. 759.) The Court rejected Venoco's claim. We reasoned: "Imposing the prejudice requirement that Venoco seeks would expand the reporting time limit and impermissibly alter its agreement with Gulf." (Id., at p. 760.) "The prejudice requirement prevents the insured forfeiting an otherwise valid claim. By contrast, compliance with the reporting requirement here is 'an element of coverage.' . The issue is whether the insured met the basic coverage requirements. . Applying a proof of prejudice requirement would both alter the coverage elements and be unfair to the insurer because it 'would materially alter the insurer's risk.' ." (Id., at p. 761.) The same reasoning applies to the one-year reporting requirement in the instant case. The "provision here is analogous to claims made and reported policies citation where time is of the essence." (Ibid.)