In Williams v. City of Belvedere (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 84, the plaintiff applied for a position as a police officer. (Id. at p. 87.) He was notified he would not be given the job in June of 1994, but discovered in October of 1995 the reason he was not hired was based upon racial discrimination. (Id. at pp. 87-88.) The appellate court concluded the plaintiff was required to file his administrative DFEH claim within one year of being notified that he would not be hired. (Id. at p. 90.) The appellate court distinguished Romano on the grounds that the Williams plaintiff was discriminated against when he was notified he was not going to be hired, whereas the Romano plaintiff was not discriminated against until he was actually discharged. (Id. at p. 92.) In Williams v. City of Belvedere (1999) the court applied the foregoing principle articulated in Pacific Scene to reject the argument that the one year period should run from the date the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the "real reason" for the adverse job action rather than from the date of such adverse action itself. In Williams, the plaintiff filed his administrative claim within are year of obtaining knowledge that he was denied employment as a police officer by the City of Belvedere due to racial prejudice. However, this was more than one year from the date of the denial of his application. Plaintiff attempted to avoid the application of the one year period set out in Government Code section 12960 by arguing that equitable principles applied to circumvent the effect of the statute of limitations. The court of appeal ruled that the FEHA had already addressed the issue of late administrative filings, and limited their availability to the 90-day rule, and not more, finding that equitable principles did not apply. The Court stated: "Thus the Legislature anticipated there may be situations where a person does not learn he was the subject of discrimination until after the one-year period has passed, and it provided a remedy when that occurs: an extension 'not to exceed 90 days.' Since the Legislature has provided a remedy for the problem Williams has identified, we decline to formulate a different remedy. We recognize the harshness of this statutory scheme which provides no relief for the claimant who remains ignorant of the existence of a claim until after the statutory deadline for filing the claim has passed. We are constrained, however, to leave this issue of policy to the Legislature. 'Once the Legislature has evidenced an intent to comprehensively define the contours of a particular field . . . such complex policy determinations must plainly remain beyond the reach of our equitable jurisdiction.' " (Id. at p. 93)