In Winograd v. American Broadcasting Company (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, parties orally stipulated to extend the five-year date and to engage in binding arbitration in a settlement conference before Judge Harris on November 2, 1994. Judge Harris recited the stipulation on the record. When the case was not arbitrated by the agreed date, a second judge, Judge Rothman, dismissed the action for failure to bring it to trial within five years. Over a year later, the plaintiff petitioned to compel arbitration. A third judge, Judge Fujisaki, denied the petition, finding the parties intended by their stipulation to preclude an order to arbitrate once the extended five-year date had passed. The plaintiff appealed. The court found that the question on appeal was "whether the record contains substantial evidence which could lead a reasonable person to construe the agreement so as to preclude an order to arbitrate once the extended five-year date of January 1, 1995, had passed." ( Winograd v. American Broadcasting Company, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) The plaintiff argued for a de novo review, claiming the court was interpreting a writing because the stipulation was placed on the record and transcribed. The court rejected that standard of review: "There are points of distinction between the instant situation and the typical situation in which a 'writing' must be construed. The stipulation in question consists not of a 'writing,' but instead a colloquy on the record between the court and two counsel, occurring in the context of a particular procedural posture which reflected upon the parties' respective motivations. Also considered by the trial judge was evidence of conduct by counsel which, although not disputed, was subject to differing interpretations. Thus, although what occurred on the record before Judges Harris and Rothman, what the procedural posture of the case was, and what occurred thereafter among counsel, is not disputed, how to evaluate the import of these events is disputed." ( Id. at pp. 631-632.) The court observed, "This situation is governed by the rule of conflicting inferences. . . . 'Where different inferences may reasonably be drawn from undisputed evidence, the conclusion of the jury or trial judge must be accepted by the appellate court. '" ( Id. at p. 633.)