Are Petitioners Entitled to Overcrowding Credits After a Higher Lawful Capacity Percentage Goes Into Effect ?

In the Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1998) case, the petitioners received overcrowding credits under a statute that provided for credits when the prison overcrowding exceeded ninety-eight percent of lawful capacity. However, the overcrowding statute in effect at the time of their offenses provided for the award of credits only when prison overcrowding exceeded ninety-nine percent of lawful capacity, and prison overcrowding never reached that level during the period in which such credits were being awarded. We noted that the United States Supreme Court had indicated in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63, 117 S. Ct. 891 (1997) that if the prison population did not exceed the relevant percentage threshold during a certain time-frame and an inmate received overcrowding credits during those years, "there is force to the argument that the cancellation of that portion [of the credits] did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." Lynce, 519 U.S. at 449. Thus, we held in Meola that the petitioners were not entitled to relief under the more generous statutes because they were part of a "separate, intervening gain-time statute that [was] more lenient than both the statute in effect at the time of the offense and the one presently in effect." Meola, 732 So. 2d at 1034 (quoting Waldrup v. Dugger, 562 So. 2d 687, 695 (Fla. 1990)) (alteration in original).