In Kalway v. Singletary, 708 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1998), the defendant filed a petition for a writ of mandamus that challenged disciplinary action imposed by the Department of Corrections. See id. at 268. Kalway claimed that the application of section 95.11(8) constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine which was rejected by this Court at that time. Section 95.11(8) provides: Any court action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings conducted by the Department of Corrections pursuant to s. 944.28(2) must be commenced within 30 days after final disposition of the prisoner disciplinary proceedings through the administrative grievance process under chapter 33, Florida Administrative Code. Any action challenging prisoner disciplinary proceedings shall be barred by the court unless it is commenced within the time period provided by this section. In Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000), the State asserted the same argument as that advanced here. The Court specifically rejected the State's assertion that Kalway applies to habeas petitions and wrote: It is important to note that, unlike the Death Penalty Reform Act, which poses equal protection and due process problems, there were no constitutional infirmities with the thirty-day deadline at issue in Kalway. However, we clarify our holding in Kalway in order to make it clear that this Court did not cede to the Legislature the power to control the time in which extraordinary writ actions must be commenced. Allen, 756 So. 2d at 62 n.4. In sum, the only argument and authority provided by the Parole Commission to support the notion that habeas petitions should be treated differently in parole revocation matters is this Court's decision in Kalway, which, in Allen, this Court clearly distinguished and rejected. The Parole Commission's claim both misstates this Court's decision in Kalway and ignores this Court's actual decision in Allen. To the contrary, Florida courts have long recognized the legitimacy and application of habeas petitions that do not challenge criminal convictions and sentences. See: State v. Luster, 596 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 1992) (interstate extradition); Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So. 2d 3, 5 (Fla. 1979) (challenge to statute under which petitioner is confined); Champion v. Cochran, 133 So. 2d 68, 68 (Fla. 1961) (confinement of a minor); Tittsworth v. Akin, 118 Fla. 454, 159 So. 779, 780 (Fla. 1935) (challenge to validity of ordinance); Ex parte Pitts, 35 Fla. 149, 17 So. 76, 76-77 (Fla. 1895) (challenge to legal existence of court by whose judgment petitioner is imprisoned); Clarke v. Regier, 881 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (involuntary hospitalization); Parsons v. Wennet, 625 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (confinement for civil contempt); MacNeil v. State, 586 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (involuntary commitment for mental illness); Lee v. State, 546 So. 2d 436, 436 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (involuntary commitment for treatment for alcoholism); 9. Durant v. Boone, 509 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (procedural validity of contempt order).