De La Rosa v. Zequeira

In De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1995), the Court established the three-prong test applicable to cases of alleged juror nondisclosure. There, the Court held: In determining whether a juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial, courts have generally utilized a three-part test. First, the complaining party must establish that the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case. Second, that the juror concealed the information during questioning. Lastly, that the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence. Id. at 241. In De La Rosa v. Zequeira, the materiality test was clearly met. In that case the jury foreperson failed to disclose that he was a defendant in six prior lawsuits. 659 So. 2d at 240 n.1. He had been subject to a final judgment in garnishment only two months prior to jury selection, and had appeared at a deposition in aid of execution only six months before jury selection. Id. Plainly such a juror would be ill-disposed to rule for a plaintiff, and would likely have been stricken for cause. The facts were so clear-cut, and the nondisclosure so clear on its face, that the case was disposed of as a matter of law without a juror interview. Whether a jury interview is necessary in a particular case depends on the circumstances. The De La Rosa court noted that where the three-part test was met, "our appellate courts have reversed for jury interviews or new trials, where jurors allegedly failed to disclose a prior litigation history or whether other information relevant to jury service was not disclosed." 659 So. 2d at 241. In other words, if the motion for new trial can be disposed of as a matter of law without a jury interview, the trial court is free to do so. However, if a juror interview is necessary in order to obtain the facts necessary to make an informed decision, then there should be an interview. In De La Rosa, the Florida Supreme Court cited Mitchell v. State, 458 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and Mitchell puts it this way: Relief will be afforded where: (1) the question propounded is straightforward and not reasonably susceptible to misinterpretation; (2) the juror gives an untruthful answer; (3) the inquiry concerns material and relevant matter to which counsel may reasonably be expected to give substantial weight in the exercise of his peremptory challenges; (4) there were peremptory challenges remaining which counsel would have exercised at the time the question was asked; (5) counsel represents that he would have peremptorily excused the juror had the juror truthfully responded. Id. at 821.