In Fenelon v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992), the Court struck down the so-called "flight exception" to the no comment rule, finding it inconsistent with the important policy concerns behind the rule: Evidence that a defendant was seen at the scene of the crime, leaving the scene, or fleeing from the scene, in most instances, would be relevant to the question of the defendant's guilt. Such evidence, like any other evidence offered at trial, is weighed and measured by its degree of relevance to the issues in the case. The flight instruction, however, treats that evidence differently from any other evidence. It provides an exception to the rule that the judge should not invade the province of the jury by commenting on the evidence or indicating what inferences may be drawn from it. Especially in criminal cases, the trial court should take great care not to intimate to the jury the court's opinion as to the weight, character, or credibility of any evidence adduced. 594 So. 2d at 294 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Whitfield, 452 So. 2d at 549). In Fenelon, the Court explained, "we can think of no valid policy reason why a trial judge should be permitted to comment on evidence of flight as opposed to any other evidence adduced at trial." Id. The Court concluded that the better policy was "to reserve comment to counsel, rather than to the court." Id. at 295.