That statute of limitation provides, in pertinent part: 95.11 Limitations other than for the recovery of real property.-- Actions other than for recovery for real property shall be commenced as follows: (5) Within one year. (f) Except for actions described in subsection (8), a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner as defined in section 57.085. In Cooper v. Florida Parole Commission, 924 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), the Fourth District held that the trial court properly denied a petition for habeas corpus as untimely, relying upon section 95.11(5)(f). However, one year later in Martin v. Florida Parole Commission, 951 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the First District rejected the argument advanced and accepted by the Fourth District in Cooper: We find this reasoning to be flawed for two reasons. First, the legitimacy of applying section 95.11(5)(f) in this situation is questionable in light of Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2000), in which the court held that the legislature was without authority to establish deadlines for asserting claims traditionally remediable through habeas corpus. More to the point, the fundamental characteristic of a habeas claim is an assertion of continued unlawful detention, and the "purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner's present detention." See Sneed v. Mayo, 69 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1954). Inasmuch as Martin alleged that he continued to be unlawfully detained, his claim was necessarily filed within the one-year time limitation established by the statute. Id. at 85-86. The First District then certified that its decision was in conflict with Cooper. See id. at 86. a few months later, in Carpenter v. Florida Parole Commission, 958 So. 2d 564, 565 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), the Second District explicitly adopted the reasoning of the First District in Martin and also certified that its decision was in conflict with Cooper.