In Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 834 (1997), the defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and possession of contraband by an inmate. Kilgore pled nolo contendere to both charges. When a death sentence was announced, Kilgore moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that his attorney had mistakenly advised him that the death sentence would not be imposed because of the plea. Although Kilgore had already filed a notice of appeal, the Court relinquished jurisdiction to the circuit court in order for it to address the motion. The motion to withdraw plea was granted and Kilgore was subsequently tried by a jury. 688 So. 2d at 897. The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his special "heat of passion" exception to premeditation. In that case, the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his prison mate homosexual lover. Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at 896. The State presented testimony that the defendant laid in wait outside the lover's cell and stabbed him three times with a shank knife when he returned. Id. at 896-97. After stabbing his lover, the defendant poured caustic liquid in his lover's face and mouth. Id. at 897. He immediately confessed to authorities that "I stabbed the bitch." Id. At his trial, the defendant requested a special "heat of passion" jury instruction which provided: An intentional unlawful killing is not premeditated murder if it was committed while the defendant was in the heat of passion brought on by sudden provocation sufficient to produce in the mind of an ordinary person the highest degree of rage, anger, or resentment that is so intense as to overcome the use of ordinary judgment thereby rendering a normal person incapable of reflection. Id. at 898. The trial court rejected the defendant's special instruction, opting instead to issue standard jury instructions on premeditation and "heat of passion" in the context of excusable homicide. Id. at 897. The defendant appealed, arguing that his special instruction would have explained "heat of passion" as a negating factor of premeditation and that by not so instructing the jury the trial court denied his right to due process. Id. The supreme court, however, disagreed, finding the standard jury instructions sufficient to instruct the jury on "heat of passion" and premeditation: Kilgore avers that he was denied due process under both the state and federal constitutions when his request for a special heat-of-passion instruction was denied. The special instruction would have explained heat of passion in the context of intentional homicide. Essentially, the instruction would have clarified that a person acting under the heat of passion is, in some circumstances, incapable of premeditation. Instead, the trial judge utilized the standard jury instructions. Included in these instruction was a discussion of heat of passion in the context of excusable homicide. Further, the requirement of premeditation in a first degree conviction was repeatedly emphasized. This Court has acknowledged that the standard jury instructions are sufficient to explain premeditation. Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 382 (Fla. 1994). The Court also ruled that the trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in denying a special heat-of-passion instruction. Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1993). After viewing these facts, we conclude that there is no indication that the trial court erred by refusing the requested instruction. The necessary elements of premeditation were presented with the standard instruction and the trial court was well within its prerogative to refuse a separate, and possibly confusing, instruction. 688 So. 2d at 898. In Kilgore v. State, the appellant was serving a life sentence at the Polk Correctional Institution for first-degree murder and kidnapping when he stabbed his homosexual lover to death outside of his cell with a homemade shank knife. Id. at 896-97. The trial court denied Kilgore's requested special jury instruction on heat of passion, which stated that a person acting under the heat of passion is incapable of premeditation in some circumstances. Id. at 897. The trial judge instead utilized the standard jury instruction of excusable homicide to explain heat of passion. Id. In finding that the trial court did not err, the Court stated: "This Court has acknowledged that the standard jury instructions are sufficient to explain premeditation. Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377, 382 (Fla. 1994). We also have ruled that the trial court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in denying a special heat-of-passion instruction. Kramer v. State, 619 So. 2d 274, 277 (Fla. 1993). After viewing these facts, we conclude that there is no indication that the trial court erred by refusing the requested instruction. The necessary elements of premeditation were presented with the standard instruction and the trial court was well within its prerogative to refuse a separate, and possibly confusing, instruction." (Id. at 898.) In sum, in Kilgore v. State, a prison murder committed by an inmate previously sentenced to life imprisonment, the trial court found two aggravators: (1) the murder was committed while the defendant was under sentence of imprisonment; (2) the defendant had a prior violent felony conviction. Id. at 897. In mitigation, the court found the two statutory mitigators of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and impairment of capacity to conform conduct to requirements of the law. Id. The court also found three nonstatutory mitigators but sentenced the defendant to death, noting the preparation involved in the murder, including the facts that the murder weapon was borrowed and the entry into the victim's dormitory was planned. Id. The Court affirmed the imposition of death. Id. at 901. The sentencing order stated: "Under certain circumstances the state not only has the right, but the obligation, to take the life of convicted murderers in order to prevent them from murdering again. This is one of those cases. To sentence Mr. Kilgore to anything but death would be tantamount to giving him a license to kill." (Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at 899.) Kilgore argued that the "license to kill" language indicated that the trial judge failed to consider any sentence other than the death penalty. The Court disagreed and held that the sentencing order was simply an attempt by the judge to evaluate the specific evidence in this case and independently apply it to Kilgore. Id. at 900.