In Sireci v. State, 399 So. 2d 964, 970 (Fla. 1981), the court held that section 921.141(5) specifically defines the aggravating circumstances that may be considered by the judge and the jury, thereby rebutting any contention that a defendant lacked notice of the aggravating circumstances on which the State would rely. Applying this reasoning in Hitchcock v. State, 413 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1982), the Court concluded that because "the statutory language of section 921.141(5) limits aggravating factors to those listed, . . . there is no reason to require the state to notify defendants of the aggravating factors that the state intends to prove." Id. at 746; See also: Cox v. State, 819 So. 2d 705, 725 (Fla. 2002); Mann v. Moore, 794 So. 2d 595, 599 (Fla. 2001); Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 927 (Fla. 1994); Medina v. State, 466 So. 2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (Fla. 1985); Tafero v. State, 403 So. 2d 355, 361 (Fla. 1981); Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278, 1282 n.21 (Fla. 1979) (citing Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 609 (5th Cir. 1978)). After Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002), the court reaffirmed this principle in Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 2003), and held that "Ring does not require . . . notice of the aggravating factors that the State will present at sentencing." Kormondy, 845 So. 2d at 54; See also: Grim v. State, 971 So. 2d 85, 103 (Fla. 2007); Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 1006 (Fla. 2006); Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 473 (Fla. 2006); Winkles v. State, 894 So. 2d 842, 846 (Fla. 2005); Hodges v. State, 885 So. 2d 338, 359 nn.9-10 (Fla. 2004); Blackwelder v. State, 851 So. 2d 650, 654 (Fla. 2003); Lynch v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 378 (Fla. 2003); Porter v. Crosby, 840 So. 2d 981, 986 (Fla. 2003).