State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny

In State ex rel. Butterworth v. Kenny, 714 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 1998), the Florida supreme court explained the historical scope of the writ of error coram nobis and its current limited applicability in the context of criminal postconviction proceedings: Historically...the writ of error coram nobis applied to situations in which the petitioner was held after judgment and sentence by due process of law, and the claim was not that the petitioner was unlawfully detained but that an error had occurred in the process and judgment. The grounds upon which a court could issue a writ of error coram nobis were more narrowly restricted than those which allowed relief by habeas corpus. While . . . coram nobis is still used in the postconviction process, its use is somewhat limited. A petition for a writ of error coram nobis is now filed to bring to the attention of a court facts that, if known at the time judgment was rendered, would have prevented rendition of the judgment. Id. at 408-409 nn. 3 & 5. The Court reviewed the attorney general's petition to prevent CCRC attorneys representing death row inmates from filing civil actions in federal court on behalf of their respective clients. In that case the Court ultimately concluded: "In creating CCRC and the right to representation for capital defendants in postconviction relief proceedings, the Florida legislature has made a choice, "based on difficult policy considerations and the allocation of scarce legal resources," to limit the representation of CCRC by (1) prohibiting that representation from extending to representation "during trials, resentencings, proceedings commenced under chapter 940, or civil litigation," 27.7001 ; and (2) providing that such representation shall be "for the sole purpose of instituting and prosecuting collateral actions challenging the legality of the judgment and sentence imposed." 27.702(1) . In our view, the statute empowers CCRC with the authority to challenge the validity of a capital defendant's conviction and sentence only through traditional postconviction relief proceedings in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings." (Kenny, 714 So. 2d at 408.)