In Garza v. State, 284 Ga. 696, 702 (1) (670 SE2d 73) (2008), the Supreme Court adopted a new standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence as to the required asportation for a kidnapping conviction. The standard is based upon the assessment of four factors: (1) the duration of the movement; (2) whether the movement occurred during the commission of a separate offense; (3) whether such movement was an inherent part of that separate offense; (4) whether the movement itself presented a significant danger to the victim independent of the danger posed by the separate offense. Id. In Garza, there had been an ongoing false imprisonment of one of the victims. Supra, 284 Ga. at 696-97. It was not until the police arrived, who knew that this victim was being held against his will inside the house, that the defendant then moved the victim. Id. at 704 (3). The Supreme Court therefore concluded that the movements "occurred as minor incidents in the course of the defendant's false imprisonment of the victim." Id. The rationale for this conclusion was that there was no evidence that the movements served to conceal the victim from police, who were already aware he was being detained, to thwart in any appreciable way the efforts of the police to free the victim, or to enhance significantly the risk the victim already faced as the victim of false imprisonment. Id. The Supreme Court held that an armed captor's forcible movement of his victim from room to room away from police during the course of a false imprisonment did not suffice to support the asportation element of a kidnapping offense. Garza, 284 Ga. at 704 (3). In so holding, the Court explained that the movements did not conceal the victim from police (who were aware of the victim's presence in the residence), did not "thwart in any appreciable way the efforts of the police to free" the victim, and did not "enhance significantly the risk the victim already faced as a victim of false imprisonment" by an armed captor. Id.