In Davenport v. Northeast Ga. Med. Center, 237 Ga. App. 252, 256 (515 S.E.2d 162) (1999), the Court determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the hospital gave Dr. Davenport adequate notice of the reasons for the proposed revocation of his staff privileges and reversed on that basis without reaching the issue of whether the summary judgment was correct. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider what constitutes "adequate notice" under 42 USC 11112 (a) (3), concluded that the HCQIA neither requires that the notice set forth the reasons for the proposed action in a formal and precise manner nor mandates that the reasons be limited in number and scope or always be restated in the same terms, reversed our decision as to adequate notice, and remanded the case so that we may consider the remaining substantive issues. Northeast Ga. Med. Center v. Davenport, 272 Ga. 173, 174 (527 S.E.2d 548) (2000). The previous judgment of this Court is vacated, and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this Court. In accordance with the mandate of the Supreme Court, we now proceed to consider and decide the remaining enumerations of error. On appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact remained and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. O.C.G.A. 9-11-56 (c). Specifically as to the HCQIA, the Court determine whether "a reasonable jury, viewing the facts in the best light for Dr. Davenport, might conclude that he has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the hospital's actions are outside the scope of 11112 (a)." Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1992); Bryan v. James E. Holmes Regional Med. Center, 33 F.3d 1318, 1332-1333 (3) (a) (11th Cir. 1994).