In Hughes v. State, 269 Ga. 258, 258-259 (497 S.E.2d 790) (1998), an officer testified that at around 3:00 a.m. in a high crime, high drug activity area of an African-American neighborhood, he saw a white man drive slowly, pick up an African-American man at a corner where drug transactions were known to occur, drive circuitously through the neighborhood, and return to the area where the passenger had been picked up. The officer testified that this was a common method for drug transactions in the area and that, in his experience, most Caucasians who came into the area were looking for drugs or prostitutes. The officer stopped the vehicle. Noting that the officer had observed no hand-to-hand contact or attempted exchange of items between the men, the Supreme Court held that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop. 269 Ga. at 260-261. In Hughes v. State the Supreme Court of Georgia set forth the principles governing the legality of an investigative stop: Although an officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle, such a stop must be justified by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in defining the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, and concluded that the essence of the elusive concept was to take the totality of the circumstances into account and determine whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.Id. at 259-260.