Was The Court's Order For New Trial Inchoate As There Was No Further Action Taken And Should The Appeal Be Considered Premature ? In MTW Investment Co. v. Alcovy Properties, 223 Ga. App. 230 (477 S.E.2d 395) (1996), the trial court issued an order under O.C.G.A. 51-12-12 (b) which granted the motion for new trial on the issue of damages, but conditioned the grant of the new trial on Alcovy's refusal to accept a reduced damage award. The trial court's order, issued on November 7, 1995, gave Alcovy two weeks from its receipt of the order to notify the court in writing of its intention to accept or refuse the reduced award. Id. at 230. On November 29, 1995, the defendants in counterclaim filed a notice of appeal from the November 7 order. On November 30, the trial court received a letter from Alcovy accepting the reduced award with the condition that Alcovy preserved its right to appeal if the defendants in counterclaim appealed the judgment. In MTW Investment v. Alcovy, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal from the November 7 order. The court stated that the November 7 order must be viewed as inchoate and that the appeal was premature Id. at 231. The court stated: While there may be opportunity for disagreement as to the proper construction of the order filed on November 7, 1995, under any reasonable view of that order the motion for new trial either remained pending or had been granted on November 29, 1995, when the first notice of appeal was filed. If the November 7, 1995 order is viewed as inchoate because anticipating further action by the trial court, the absence of any such further action left pending the motion for new trial of the defendants-in-counterclaim. In the alternative, if the November 7, 1995 order does not anticipate any further action by the trial court, it must be viewed as inchoate pending a timely response by Alcovy. If this is not the case, we are confronted with uncertainty since Alcovy was not required to respond by a date certain, but instead within a period of time following receipt of the trial court's order of November 7, 1995. Thus, on November 29, 1995, the date of the filing of the notice of appeal from the order of November 7, 1995, there was nothing of record to indicate whether a ruling on the motion for new trial remained pending in anticipation of Alcovy's response or whether the expiration of the time allocated for that response had resulted in the grant of a motion for new trial. But in either case the appeal is premature. Id.