In Roman v. Terrell, 195 Ga. App. 219, 219-222 (2), (3) (393 SE2d 83) (1990), where we addressed the exact question at issue in this case, we held that the statutory language was ambiguous in the punitive damages context because even though it requires a UM provider to pay for "all sums" that an insured is entitled to recover, it limits the recoverable damages to those that result "because of" bodily injury or property damage. OCGA 33-7-11 (a) (1) (A); Roman, 195 Ga. App. at 221 (2). An award of punitive damages stems not from a victim's bodily injury or property damage, but from a desire to punish the conduct of a wrongdoer. See Roman, 195 Ga. App. at 221 (2). The Court therefore invoked the rules of statutory construction in order to determine the intent of the Georgia legislature. After applying the maxims of expressio unius est exclusio alterius -- the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another -- and expressum facit cessare tacitum -- if some (of many) things are expressly mentioned, the inference is stronger that those omitted are intended to be excluded -- we concluded that "the purely technical application of the rules of statutory construction favors the conclusion that ... the legislature's intention was to permit recovery only of compensatory, and not punitive damages." Id. at 221 (3) (a). The Court also were persuaded by the reality ... that most uninsured motorists are judgment proof, or at least difficult judgment debtors against whom to satisfy judgments. The uninsured motorist insurance statute was designed to compensate their victims for this reason. ... Allowing punitive damages to be awarded against an insurance company can serve no deterrent function because the wrongdoer is not the person paying the damages. There is no point in punishing the insurance company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course, the burden would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but on the public, since the added liability to the insurance companies would be passed along to the premium payers. Society would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the tortfeasor. This cannot be the intended purpose of our statute. Roman, 195 Ga. App. at 222 (3) (b).