Thompson v. Bank of the South

Bank Not Entitled To A General Release From Any And All Liability With Respect To Claims Arising Out Of Handling Of Funds: Thompson v. Bank of the South, 172 Ga. App. 579 (323 S.E.2d 877) (1984) the Court discussed the concept of interpleader and the protection from liability afforded by that doctrine: The right to interpleader under O.C.G.A. 9-11-22 depends upon the stakeholder's good-faith fear of adverse claims. The adverse claims which authorize interpleader are those which might be brought against the stakeholder by the various claimants to the fund which he holds. Thus, where the adverse claims on a fund have in fact been interpleaded, it is proper to dismiss the holder of the disputed fund as a party to the action, assuming that no further relief against the holder is being sought or necessary. This is true because, if no direct personal liability is being sought and the only claims being asserted are to the fund that a party holds, his capacity in the action is that of merely a stakeholder. Under such circumstances, the mere stakeholder's successful invocation of the interpleader procedure serves to discharge him from the threat of potential liability to the adverse claimants of the disputed funds. Id. at 582 (2). In Thompson, a bank successfully interpleaded funds in certain accounts it held. In its original order granting the interpleader motion, the trial court stated that the bank was "released from any and all liability with respect to claims arising from or relating to its receipt, payment, delivery or other handling of the funds." The court subsequently amended its order to remove this broad release language, however, stating that such language had the unintended effect of settling issues not raised in the case. The Court held that the court properly removed the broad release language, stating that the Bank was not . . . entitled to a general release from any and all liability regarding the . . . accounts. Assuming the existence of claims predicated upon the Bank's existing personal liability to whoever was the rightful claimant of the . . . accounts, such claims would not be based upon the Bank's capacity as the "mere stakeholder" of the disputed accounts, and the authorization of its interpleader action in the instant case would not resolve those claims. To give but one example, payment into court of an existing bank account fund pursuant to interpleader would not necessarily serve to extinguish any existing personal liability to the rightful claimant under O.C.G.A. 11-3-419 for the holder's previous conversion of the funds in that account. The trial court correctly recognized that the language of its previous order afforded the Bank unwarranted protection from potential claims premised upon its personal liability with regard to the . . . accounts, rather than limiting that protection merely to its potential liability as against the "adverse claims" of the two claimants to the accounts. Id. at 582-583 (2).