In Duncavage v. Allen, 147 Ill. App. 3d 88, 497 N.E.2d 433, 100 Ill. Dec. 455 (1986), the court dismissed a survival action claim for punitive damages under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2006)), stating: "The circumstances here fall short of the requirements of Froud. Although section 10(a) of the Consumer Fraud Act provides that a court may award any relief which it deems proper, the Act does not explicitly authorize punitive damages." Duncavage, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 103. The court noted that its previous recognition that punitive damages were available under the Consumer Fraud Act did not decide the issue of whether those damages could be recovered in a survival action. Duncavage, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 103; See also LaSalle National Bank v. Quality Excavation, Inc., 378 Ill. App. 3d 307, 322, 880 N.E.2d 1075, 317 Ill. Dec. 83 (2007) (where no provision of the Adjacent Landowner Excavation Protection Act (765 ILCS 140/1 (West 2002)) expressly provided for punitive damages, court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments concerning the statute's general policy and their insistence upon "a statutory association" permitting survival of their punitive damages claims). Similarly, in Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 108 Ill. 2d 243, 251-52, 483 N.E.2d 1263, 91 Ill. Dec. 628 (1985), our supreme court considered a claim for damages brought under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Deceptive Practices Act) (815 ILCS 510/1 et seq. (West 2006)). There, the defendants argued that damages were unavailable under that statute where it provided for specific relief (i.e., injunctive relief, attorney fees, and costs) but also provided that the relief available " 'is in addition to remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common law or other statutes of this State.' " Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 252, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 121 1/2, par. 313. The court questioned whether damages were therefore available under that statute, or whether the provision meant simply that the specified remedies were not exclusive and that damages were available only if a common-law or statutory action was pleaded in another proceeding. Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 252. The court concluded that damages were not available under the Deceptive Practices Act but, rather, that the statute permitted a plaintiff to seek damages through a separate action. Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 253.