In Melvin v. Burling, 141 Ill. App. 3d 786, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 95 Ill. Dec. 919 (1986) the court set out four elements that a plaintiff must plead and prove to state a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion: (1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's seclusion; (2) an intrusion that is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; (4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering. Melvin, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 789. See also the second district case of Benitez v. KFC National Management Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 714 N.E.2d 1002, 239 Ill. Dec. 705 (1999), recognizing a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. Since the third district's decision in Melvin, the first district has applied Melvin's four elements without directly addressing the issue of whether a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion exists in this state. In Mucklow v. John Marshall Law School, 176 Ill. App. 3d 886, 531 N.E.2d 941, 126 Ill. Dec. 314 (1988), Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 202 Ill. App. 3d 976, 560 N.E.2d 900, 148 Ill. Dec. 303 (1990), and again in Dwyer v. American Express Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 742, 652 N.E.2d 1351, 210 Ill. Dec. 375 (1995), this district found that the plaintiff's allegations did not satisfy the first element of Melvin, but failed to express a view as to the conflict regarding the recognition of the intrusion upon seclusion cause of action. Mucklow, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 894; Miller, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 981; Dwyer, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 745-46.