In In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 905 N.E.2d 757, 328 Ill. Dec. 868 (2009), the respondent minor argued that "even if the circuit court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter and personal jurisdiction over all parties, the State's failure to give notice to her father of the amended petition violated her due-process rights." M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 429, 905 N.E.2d at 772. M.W. suggested that her father "might have been motivated to attend the later proceedings if he had been aware of the seriousness of the charges against her and that she might have benefitted from his advice and counsel." M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 430, 905 N.E.2d at 772. M.W. did not raise this issue before the trial court. As a result, the supreme court reviewed the alleged error pursuant to the plain-error doctrine. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 431-32, 905 N.E.2d at 773. The supreme court found the State's failure to give the respondent minor's father notice of the amendment was error. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 432, 905 N.E.2d at 773. According to the court: "A party's appearance in a proceeding under the Act constitutes consent to personal jurisdiction and waiver of formal service of 'the petition' that is pending at that time. 705 ILCS 405/5-525(4) (West 2004). It does not constitute waiver of notice of supplemental or amended petitions under section 5-530. Indeed, section 5-525(3) specifically provides for subsequent notice under section 5-530 to parties over whom 'jurisdiction has been established.' 705 ILCS 405/5-525(3) (West 2004). Based on the plain language of the applicable sections of the Act, we conclude that the error was also clear and obvious." M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 432, 905 N.E.2d at 773. The court was then left to determine if a remedy for the error was required. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 432, 905 N.E.2d at 773. The court stated: "M.W. argues that if her father had known of the addition of the aggravated- battery charge, he might have attended the adjudicatory hearing and that she might have benefitted from his advice and his presence. At oral argument, counsel for M.W. suggested that her father, if he had been present, might have encouraged her to take responsibility for the lesser offense of aggravated battery while denying responsibility for the greater offense of robbery, leading to a lesser sentence. However, she does not suggest how the fairness of the proceeding was undermined by his absence. Her mother was present at the hearing and she was represented by counsel. Either of these advisors could have counseled her in the manner suggested by appellate counsel. The one significant decision that she seems to have made, presumably with the advice of these adults, is to testify to her own version of the events on the bus. Even if her father had been present and had persuaded her not to testify, the outcome would not have been different, because there would have been no rebuttal whatsoever to the testimony of the State's witnesses. We fail to see how the error of failing to give notice of the amended petition to her father, when he had been given notice at the commencement of the proceedings pursuant to section 5-525(4) of the Act and when he had actual notice of the more serious of the two charges, affected the fairness of M.W.'s adjudication or undermined the integrity of the process." M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 439-40, 905 N.E.2d at 777-78. The court went on to find M.W. was not entitled to a new adjudicatory hearing on the basis of plain error. M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 440, 905 N.E.2d at 778.