In In re Custody of Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d 169, 450 N.E.2d 368, 70 Ill. Dec. 895 (1983), the court held, "we do not think that the legislature, by providing different forms for different routes to adoption, intended that no distinction be drawn between the different forms and that a consent to adoption be interchangeable with a surrender to an agency." In re Custody of Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 172-73, 450 N.E.2d at 370. Implicit in this recognition is the fact that subsection (C) contains language indicating the child is surrendered to an agency for adoption at the agency's discretion, whereas subsection (A) indicates the parent is giving consent to a specific adoption. Nees v. Doan, 185 Ill. App. 3d 122, 128, 540 N.E.2d 1046, 1050, 133 Ill. Dec. 180 (1989). Although the Adoption Act does not provide for consents favoring specific individuals, we previously have determined that where a proceeding contemplates adoption by specific parties the consent may be revoked if that adoption fails to materialize, and that under section 10(C), a consent to adoption must be distinguished from a surrender to an agency where there is no limitation as to who may adopt. In re Adoption of L.R.B., 278 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1094-95, 664 N.E.2d 347, 349, 215 Ill. Dec. 950 (1996), citing In re Joseph B., 258 Ill. App. 3d 954, 963-68, 630 N.E.2d 1180, 1187-90, 197 Ill. Dec. 56 (1994), Nees, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 128-29, 540 N.E.2d at 1049-50 (1989), and In re Custody of Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 172-73, 450 N.E.2d at 370. Moreover, the naming of the prospective adoptive parents in the caption of the consent to adoption form is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding that the parent's consent was so limited. In re Joseph B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 967, 630 N.E.2d at 1189.