In People v. Odumuyiwa, 188 Ill. App. 3d 40, 544 N.E.2d 405, 135 Ill. Dec. 909 (1989), the Second District considered whether the Illinois Secretary of State was able to suspend the defendant's driving privilege after he had already cancelled the defendant's driver's license. The court observed that the term "license to drive" covers two distinct meanings: (1) the physical document itself; (2) the abstract intangible privilege of driving. Odumuyiwa, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 44. Since nothing in the record explained why the defendant's driver's license was cancelled or why his driving privileges were suspended, the reviewing court saw "no reason why these two actions by the Secretary should be considered mutually exclusive or logically inconsistent." Odumuyiwa, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 45.