In Blount v. Stroud, 232 Ill. 2d 302, 904 N.E.2d 1, 328 Ill. Dec. 239 (2009), the supreme court held that the plaintiff could bring her federal claim (based on 42 U.S.C. 1981 (2000)) and her state common-law claim (based on retaliatory termination of employment) in the circuit court, because neither cause of action arose under the Illinois Act and thus the exclusivity provision of the Illinois Act (775 ILCS 5/8--111(C) (West 2006)) did not apply. Specifically, the supreme court stated that "the administrative procedures contained in the [Illinois] Act, which govern the filing and disposition of alleged 'civil rights violations,' are applicable only to civil rights violations under the Illinois Act." Blount, 232 Ill. 2d at 326. The court continued, "In other words, the limitation on the court's jurisdiction applies only to civil rights violations defined by and arising under the Illinois Act." Blount, 232 Ill. 2d at 329.