In People v. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d 341, 403 N.E.2d 229, 38 Ill. Dec. 141 (1980), on the morning of trial, the defendant presented to the trial court, for the first time, his request to substitute private counsel for the public defender. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 348. The defendant claimed he had suffered a "sudden loss of confidence in the public defender." Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 348. Private counsel appeared in court but indicated he could not be proceed to trial immediately, "stating that defendant had first contacted him three days prior to trial." Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 348. The trial court determined that the request was not timely and denied the motion for substitution of counsel. In Friedman, it appears only a motion for substitution of counsel was filed; no motion for a continuance was urged before the trial court. It was clear, however, that allowing the substitution of counsel would have unavoidably delayed the trial. Consequently, our supreme court began its analysis of the claimed error by examining whether a continuance should have been granted. The Friedman court noted that by statute, a "court may grant a continuance if the 'interests of justice' so demand (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, pars. 114-4(d), (f))." Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 347; now see 725 ILCS 5/114-4(d), (f) (West 2000). In deciding whether the interests of justice require that a firm trial date be set back, the supreme court observed that the trial court must balance competing interests: "'criminal cases are tried with due diligence consonant with the rights of the defendant and the State to a speedy, fair and impartial trial.'" Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 347, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 114-4(h) (now see 725 ILCS 5/114-4(h) (West 2000)). In cases like Friedman the initial question is "whether the denial of a continuance violates a substantive right of the accused." Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 348. The answer turns on the particular facts of the case. Friedman, 79 Ill. 2d at 348.