People v. Jefferson

In People v. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d 486, 492, 705 N.E.2d 56, 235 Ill. Dec. 443 (1998), our supreme court held that evidence of a scheduled polygraph examination was admissible. The defendant in Jefferson testified at trial that she signed an inculpatory statement because the officer told her that if she signed the statement, she could go home. While cross-examining the defendant, the State sought to present evidence regarding the defendant's agreement to take a polygraph test and her subsequent decision to confess prior to taking the scheduled polygraph. The trial court allowed the introduction of the evidence. Our supreme court held that the scheduled polygraph test was offered for the proper limited purpose of explaining the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession after the defendant claimed at trial that her confession was induced by promises from a police officer. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 495-96. The jury received IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07 along with a non- pattern limiting instruction that advised the jury in the following terms: "'You heard some testimony concerning a polygraph test. You may consider that evidence for a limited purpose only, not for the fact that someone did or didn't take a polygraph test. You will consider it only for the limited purpose of deciding whether the statement given by the defendant was voluntary or involuntary, for that purpose only, a limited purpose.'" Our supreme court found that this limiting instruction was incorrect because the voluntariness of a confession is to be determined by the trial judge alone. Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 498. Our supreme court noted that while the admissibility of the confession shall not be submitted to the jury, "'the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession may be submitted to the jury as bearing upon the credibility or the weight to be given to the confession.'" Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 498, quoting section 114-11(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114-11(f) (West 1994)). In Jefferson, despite the incorrect limiting instruction, our supreme court determined that it was not reversible error under the circumstances of that case. The court held that "notwithstanding the use of the term 'voluntariness' in the cautionary instruction, we do not believe that the jury would have misconstrued the significance of the polygraph evidence or would have considered it for some purpose other than the one for which it was offered." Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 499. The court explained that the jury received the separate instruction regarding the defendant's inculpatory statement, pursuant to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.06-3.07. Our supreme court determined that this "instruction correctly shaped and guided the jury's inquiry, and we believe that the jurors would have understood their task to involve a determination whether the defendant's statement was unreliable because it had been induced by promises from the authorities, as the defendant asserted." Jefferson, 184 Ill. 2d at 499.